LSAT Readiness Test

Read the following passage, then answer the question. Passage: To sue in federal court, plaintiffs need 'standing' — a concrete injury fairly traceable to the defendant. Environmental plaintiffs often struggle: who is injured by climate change in the legally cognizable sense? In Massachusetts v. EPA, the state established standing through its coastline — sovereign territory the sea would swallow. The injury was particularized by property lines. Critics argue standing doctrine smuggles merits into procedure: judges who doubt a claim find no standing, avoiding hard questions. Defenders reply that courts need limits — without standing, anyone could sue over anything, and the judiciary would become a council of revision. Climate change strains the doctrine because the injury is diffuse, future, and shared — everything standing doctrine disfavors. Some scholars propose relaxing the requirements for public-law cases; others warn that would politicize the courts. The coastline solution worked once; whether it generalizes is the standing question of our century. Question: The coastline solution is most analogous to:

Democracy is the best form of government because the best form of government is democracy. Which of the following, if true, most strengthens the argument?

Read the following passage, then answer the question. Passage: Tort law's negligence standard asks what a 'reasonable person' would have done — an objective measure that judges conduct against community norms rather than individual capacities. The genius of the standard is its flexibility: reasonable care on a playground differs from reasonable care in an operating room, yet one formula covers both. Critics note the formula's circularity: the reasonable person is defined by what courts find reasonable, which is defined by the reasonable person. And the standard can smuggle in bias — whose community's norms count? Early cases measured women and minorities against a white male 'reasonable man.' Modern courts acknowledge the problem without fully solving it. Still, alternatives fare worse. Strict liability would overdeter useful activity; subjective standards would excuse the clumsy by their own clumsiness. The reasonable person survives because it expresses an inescapable idea: that we owe each other the care we can fairly expect in return. Question: In context, “overdeter” most nearly means:

Either we cut the project or we go bankrupt. We can't go bankrupt, so the project must be cut. Which of the following, if true, most weakens the argument?

Read the following passage, then answer the question. Passage: Legal positivism holds that law is a matter of social fact: a norm is law because it was enacted by recognized procedures, not because it is moral. On this view, an unjust statute is still law — 'law' describes pedigree, not merit. The thesis promises clarity: identify the sources, and you've identified the law. Critics object that the separation of law and morality is itself a moral choice, and a dangerous one — it tells judges to enforce wicked statutes with a clear conscience. Positivists reply that calling evil law 'law' is honest: it forces the moral question into the open instead of hiding it behind definitional fiat. The Nazi-law debate made this more than academic. Perhaps the deepest issue is what we want jurisprudence for. If the aim is conceptual clarity about a social institution, positivism delivers. If the aim is to guide judges confronting evil law, its deliverances are thinner. A theory can be true as description and inadequate as guidance — and much positivism-bashing confuses the two ambitions. Question: The description/guidance distinction is most analogous to:

No one has ever proven that this herbal supplement has side effects, so it must be completely safe. Which of the following, if true, most strengthens the argument?

Read the following passage, then answer the question. Passage: Antitrust law promises to protect competition, but 'competition' is ambiguous. The Chicago School argued the goal should be consumer welfare — low prices, high output — and that most business practices challenged in court actually benefit consumers. On this view, antitrust should be humble, intervening only against clear output restrictions. The Neo-Brandeisians reply that consumer welfare is too narrow. Concentrated economic power threatens democracy, workers, and innovation even when prices stay low — Amazon's low prices coexist with squeeze on suppliers and sellers. Antitrust, they argue, was originally a check on bigness itself, not a price-optimization program. The dispute is partly empirical — do dominant firms raise prices eventually? — but mostly philosophical: what is economic liberty for? Until that question is answered, antitrust doctrine will oscillate, with each era's enforcers reading their own anxieties into the Sherman Act's spare text. Question: Which would most support the Chicago view?

Evolution is like a blind watchmaker, so just as watches need designers, species must have had a designer. Which of the following, if true, most strengthens the argument?

Read the following passage, then answer the question. Passage: Title VII forbids employment discrimination 'because of' race, sex, and other protected traits. But causation in discrimination is elusive: employers rarely announce bias, and decisions turn on mixed motives. Courts developed frameworks — McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting, 'motivating factor' tests — to smoke out discrimination from circumstantial evidence. The frameworks creak under modern workplaces. Algorithmic hiring tools inherit historical biases; 'culture fit' interviews launder subjective preference; and the line between legitimate business judgment and pretext is thin. Plaintiffs must show the employer's stated reason is unworthy of credence — a showing that requires resources most workers lack. Some scholars propose shifting from intent to impact: if a practice foreseeably excludes protected groups without business necessity, it should fall regardless of motive. The proposal trades one difficulty for another — defining 'business necessity' — but it at least aims at the right target: workplaces that are fair in fact, not merely in intent. Question: The main point is that discrimination doctrine:

Just as a doctor prescribes antibiotics for a bacterial infection, governments should prescribe spending cuts for an economic downturn — both kill the harmful condition. Which of the following, if true, most weakens the argument?